The Battle of Pokrovsk, China’s Plan for Long-Term Confrontation and China Cranky at Japan: The Big Five, 16 November edition

Image: Ukrainian Liut Brigade and @DefenceU
It has been another big week for news on modern war.
The Ukrainians, while focused on the defence of Pokrovsk and pounding Russia in their strike campaign, are also enduring another government corruption scandal as well as nightly aerial assaults by the Russians.
In the Pacific, China outlined its long-term plan for military and economic confrontation with the West while pushing back on the recent comments by the new Japanese Prime Minister about the security of Taiwan and Japan.
Welcome to my weekly update on modern war and strategic competition!
The Battle of Pokrovsk. The Russian double envelopment of Pokrovsk is nearing completion. At present, the single potential withdrawal route from the area currently occupied by Ukrainian defenders is only about 2-3 kilometres wide. This does not include several kilometres of ‘grey zone’ at the leading edges of the southern and northern axes of the Russian double envelopment.
The Ukrainian president, in statements this week, acknowledged the difficult circumstances facing Ukrainian defenders (that is an understatement if ever I heard one), but has deferred any decision on staying or withdrawing to the Ukrainian commander-in-chief. Zelenskyy was quoted as follows:
No one is forcing them to die for the sake of ruins. I will support our soldiers, especially the commanders who are there, in how they can control the situation, or if it’s too expensive for us. The most important thing for us is our soldiers.
Changes in Pokrovsk situation since start of November. Maps: DeepState.live
Zelenskyy’s comments, and the situation in Pokrovsk, highlight again Ukraine’s central strategic dilemma on the ground. Do they try to hold as much ground as possible, in the recognition that it might result in higher Ukrainian casualties. Or, do they focus on force preservation while using the terrain to inflict maximum casualties on the Russians.
But, in the Battle of Pokrovsk, the Ukrainian commander-in-chief has chosen to do a bit of both. As his most recent Telegram post describes:
Yesterday, I held a working meeting with the commanders of the units engaged in combat operations in the Pokrovske and Ochertynske directions, specifically directly in the area of the Pokrovsko-Myrnohrad agglomeration. I heard reports on the operational situation in the areas of responsibility. The enemy does not cease attempts to break into residential areas, apartment buildings, and establish themselves there to expand their control zone. In view of this, we developed a set of measures to counter the enemy’s plans.
The greatest attention was given to the issues of sustainable logistics for the Defense Forces units, as well as countering the enemy’s use of FPV drones, reconnaissance UAVs, artillery, and mortars. Additional action options were worked out for various scenarios of situation development.
Ukrainian warriors continue to inflict significant losses on the enemy both in manpower and equipment, localizing their movements. Our commanders act with mandatory consideration of the need to preserve the life and health of subordinate personnel.
This is either a very clever deception plan, or a plan to stay and fight in Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk now has limited military value, although it does have potential use as a launch point for subsequent Russian offensive operations on the ground and with drones. Given the ability of Russian drones now to not only engage in the close fight but also in deep operations, this is a consideration in the hold or leave calculus of Ukrainian strategic military leaders. That said, Russia already holds ground to the west and north of Pokrovsk from which it might launch such attacks, so the value of the territory in the pocket still held by Ukraine should not be over estimated.
Thus, it is probably time to think about an orderly withdrawal while it is still possible to do so. The reserves that Ukraine is committing to hold onto this pocket of territory can probably be used better elsewhere. They will certainly be required for re-setting Ukraine’s eastern defences.
While the fall of Pokrovsk would provide Putin some strategic messaging and propaganda gains, it would not change the overall trajectory of the war at this point.
One interesting point from the last few weeks in the Battle for Pokrovsk: once again, the impact of weather on military operations – especially drone operations – has raised its head. The Russians have become adept at using fog to cover their offensive operations given the degradation by fog of Ukraine drone surveillance and strike activities. The Ukrainians do the same.
Many drone advocates have overlooked this obvious point, which has been observed in each of the winters during this war. And contrary to media reports, fog and other weather effects are not a ‘new player’ in this war or any other. The weather has always had an impact on miltary operations. It is a topic of relevance when examining the application of drones elsewhere in the world, a subject I examined recently in my study of how we might translate Ukraine lessons for the Pacific theatre.
While drones are a crucial part of Ukraine’s defence, artillery remains critical to combined arms defensive and offensive activities. Image: @DefenceU
Another corruption scandal. The Government of Ukraine is currently working its way through another major corruption scandal. Described by the Kyiv Independent as “the biggest corruption scandal of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s term”, the latest scandal involves an investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. It alleges that Timur Mindich, an ally of Zelensky, led a group that received kickbacks from energy construction and procurement, including building defences for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, and laundering the proceeds.
It goes without saying that this latest corruption scandal hurts Zelenskyy at home and it hurts him and Ukraine abroad. According to a report in Politico, the EU is “seeking reassurances from Ukraine over future financial support to the country after a far-reaching corruption probe revealed a $100 million kickback scheme tied to its energy sector.”
The scandal also provides enormous amounts of ammunition for Russian misinformation campaigns as well as for those who seek to reduce the level of support being provided to Ukraine by western nations.
In a social media post on 15 November, Zelenskyy committed to reform and described specific actions for the energy firms Energoatom, Ukrhydroenergo, the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine and Naftogaz. He also stated that:
We are beginning the overhaul of key state-owned enterprises in the energy sector. Alongside a full audit of their financial activities, the management of these companies is to be renewed. Today, together with Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko and Minister of Economy Oleksii Sobolev, we defined the course of action.
I have also instructed government officials to maintain constant and meaningful communication with law enforcement and anti-corruption bodies. Any scheme uncovered in these companies must receive a swift and just response. Full transparency and integrity in the energy sector remain an absolute priority.
Ukraine continues striking Russia. Some signature strikes against Russia were conducted by the Ukrainians in the past few days.
Ukraine’s strike on Novorossiysk oil terminal. Image: The Maritime Executive.
First, Ukrainian military forces executed precision strikes against oil infrastructure. This included the Ryazansky oil refinery, which produces gasoline, diesel, liquefied gas, and aaviation kerosene for the Russian Aerospace Forces, was hit by multiple explosions. Also hit was the Lukoil refinery in Volgograd, the Saratov refinery, and the oil loading facilities at the port of Novorossiysk. This final strike, according to some reports, has taken offline (at least temporarily) up to 2% of global oil available for trade.
Next, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that it had destroyed four S-400 Triumph launchers and two radar systems during a strike on Novorossiysk in Russia. This was part of a long-term campaign to degrade Russian air defences to enable Ukrainian strikes deeper into Russia. As an SBU source reported to the Kyiv Post:
The SBU continues methodically destroying enemy air defence systems that protect critical military, infrastructure, and logistical sites. Each destroyed system creates a gap in Russian defences that Ukrainian drones and missiles will exploit.
To read more about how Ukraine has developed its deep strike capability over the past four years, and what western nations can learn from this, see this article.
Image: @IndoPACOM
The Pentagon’s Acquisition Reform. This is a topic relevant to both European and Asian security affairs. Not only does it potentially offer a speeding up of acquisitions to acceleration the learning and adaptation cycle in military institutions, it also offers a potential example for other nations’ military organisations whose innovation and adaptation is being held back by slow, zero-risk acquisition policies. The Pentagon media release on this topic can be read here.
Arms for Taiwan Announced. This week, a proposed package of military equipment for Taiwan was announced. The package includes nonstandard components, spare and repair parts, accessories, and repair and return support for F-16, C-130 and Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Fighter aircraft. The U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency has delivered certification notifying the US Congress of the sale.
Japan’s Taiwan Posture. Recently, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that if a “Taiwan contingency” were to occur — an emergency situation involving the use of force — it could constitute a “situation threatening Japan’s survival.” In these circumstance, Japan might exercise its right to collective self-defence.
In a predictable move this week, the CCP has indicated that it did not really appreciate these comments. Part of the Chinese response, provided by the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Office, is as follows:
There is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is part of China. The egregious remarks concerning Taiwan made openly by a Japanese leader in the Diet seriously violate the one-China principle and constitute a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs. We express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to this. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has lodged solemn representations and strong protests with the Japanese side.
Japan bears historical guilt toward the Chinese people on the Taiwan issue and committed countless crimes during its 50 years of colonial rule and enslavement of Taiwan. Eighty years ago, we defeated the Japanese aggressors, recovered Taiwan, and ended Japan’s occupation and plunder. Eighty years later, anyone who dares to challenge China’s core interests or attempts to obstruct the great cause of China’s reunification will find that the Chinese government, the Chinese people, and the Chinese military will never agree and will never tolerate it.
A couple of points need to be made here. The CCP did not defeat Japan in the Pacific, and it has neither possessed nor recovered Taiwan at any point since the formation of the PRC in 1949. But then again, historical facts have never gotten in the way of a good propaganda yarn for the CCP.
The larger message is that any time a nation offers any kind of support for Taiwan, the CCP will engage every lever it has to bully, cajole, coerce and aggressively push back on such support. But we already knew that.
And to put an exclamation mark on China’s displeasure at the Japanese PM, Senior Colonel Jiang Bin, spokesman for China’s Ministry of National Defense, stated that Japan will suffer a “crushing defeat” by the PLA if they were to “use force to interfere in the Taiwan question.”
China’s Plan for Confrontation with the West. During Fourth Plenum of the Twentieth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) was ratified. There are many elements of this plan, but an important part of it is setting up China to undertake a sustained period of confrontation with America and other western nations.
There are three important characteristics of the strategy (as described by Matthew Johnson):
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Centralized control of strategic resources and flows. The CCP seeks to sustain its command over the components of Chinese production, which allows it to calibrate access, pricing, and supply as tools of deterrence and coercion. The aim is strategic interdependence: a system flexible enough to weaponise trade while preserving internal stability through external market access and resource absorption.
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Directed innovation through the “new national system.” Xi’s new national system (transforms the Party-state into a permanent strategic mobilization machine, fusing industry, research, and security planning. By integrating AI, infrastructure, and state finance into a single command framework, Beijing seeks to ensure technological catch-up and retaliation are routine functions of governance.
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Security as the organizing principle of development. Economic growth, once an end in itself, is now subordinated to the preservation of political control and survival under pressure. The guiding design, “using a new security pattern to guarantee a new development pattern”, recasts every policy domain, from technology to the One Belt One Road initiative, as an element of long-term confrontation management.
The full exploration of the impacts of this Five Year Plan by Matthew Johnson is included in my recommended readings for this week.
New Chinese Big Deck Amphib. This week, the Chinese Navy (PLAN) Type 076 amphibious assault ship Sichuan started its first sea trial. The new amphibious carrier, which uniquely contains an electromagnetic catapult for launching fixed wing drones, is around the same size as the U.S. Navy’s America class LHD.
Image: Naval News
The ship, while designed to facilitate amphibious operations, will probably also deploy combat drones. It is unclear which type of drone the Chinese will choose to deploy from the Type 076. Given the Chinese are yet to pursue a crewed STOVL capability to support amphibious operations, the uncrewed combat drones launched from the Type 076 may seek to fill this capability gap.
Photo of the week
Every now and then, I share a photo related to military operations, equipment or people that takes my fancy. I don’t do it every week. However, this week I came across this image that was shared on the Twitter / X feed of the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike Group. It is, simply, lightning over Lightnings.
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This week I published a new report with the Special Competitive Studies Project in Washington DC. The report proposes that adaptation in the Ukraine War has now metastasised into a global Adaptation War.
The aim of this report is to examine the new adversary learning and adaptation bloc that has emerged joining Iran, North Korea, Russia and China, and to explore the various components of this global Adaptation War. The report also offers recommendations for western nations about how they might compete with this new learning and adaptation bloc.
You can read the full report at this link.
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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.
I have included a new article that examines the state of the debate on cognitive warfare published by Small Wars Journal. There are also articles that examine drones and the revolution in military affairs, China’s plan for long-term confrontation with the West, frontline operations in Ukraine as well as will and resilience in modern war.
As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
In this new article from Frank Hoffman that was published at Small Wars Journal, the author explores the current state of the debate and various literature on a topic that is alternatively described as cognitive warfare and cognitive domain operations. Frank offers a detailed examination of western, Chinese and Russian approaches, and writes that “the scope of Cognitive Warfare would have to incorporate efforts to develop and attain cognitive advantage at both the individual and collective level, as well as detecting and defending against cognitive domain operations.” The article provides a new and useful definition for cognitive warfare that should inform debate in western military and government institutions on this subject. The full article is available at this link.
This recent article published by the Military Strategy Magazine examines the legacy of British academic and strategist Colin Gray’s work on revolutions in military affairs, and how this might be employed to guide our thinking about the rise of autonomous systems in military institutions world-wide. The author offers that “while keeping in mind Gray’s admonition to use analogies cautiously, the rise of drones does appear to be the next phase of the information-based RMA that was first identified by Soviet theorists in the 1970s.” But he also provides a caution: “Nevertheless, just as battlefield necessity led to the rapid eruption and dynamism of drone warfare, the interaction of the demands of some future battlefield and emergent technology will push drones into the background.” You can read the article here.
Recently, the Twentieth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Fourth Plenum, during which it ratified the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). In this terrific article published by the Jamestown Foundation, the author examines the contents of this five year plan. The article examines how Xi is using this plan to consolidate his command of the Party, military and economic systems in China, and is employing this as a foundation for a long-term confrontation with the United States and the west. As the author notes, “the result is a model of strategic endurance—a self-contained system able to sustain rivalry with the United States through control of capital allocation, industrial organization, and information flows.” The full article is available at this link.
One of the best journalists covering the frontline situation in Ukraine today is the Kyiv Independent’s Francis Farrell. Francis has provided a stream of high-quality reporting and analysis about the war since its beginning. In this new piece, the author examines the current state of the frontline, with a focus on how Russia might exploit the current situation in eastern Ukraine to begin more active operations in souther Ukraine. It is a worthy read, and available at this link.
Wars are not just fought by military organisations – they are fought by entire nations. This is a point that is reinforced in this new essay by Daniel Byman, published in the Center for Strategic and International Studies War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East. As the author notes, “in both Ukraine and Israel, the story of resilience is not only about battlefield endurance but also the mobilization of society—military, civilian, technological, and psychological—to resist aggression and maintain national cohesion. Their experiences underscore the critical importance of preparing societies for long-term conflict, including safeguarding infrastructure, cultivating civilian readiness, and maintaining the credibility of national narratives in the global information space.” You can read the full article at this link.




