Defence Secretary John Healey has since confirmed that rules of engagement (ROE) for situations like this have been reviewed and adjusted. This is significant as ROE determines when you are legally allowed to conduct a direct military response. This is different to self-defence which is a right you have all the time. In outline, it allows you to be more aggressive. Boarding, riding off, jamming and other electronic warfare measures all come under ROE. At the top end there are rules such as ‘Hostile intent’ which effectively allows you to take the gloves off. This will not be what’s been allocated here, despite what so many wish for in these cases, but just saying the ROE has changed is significant. We won’t know the details, but then neither will they.
ROE, although a necessity, is precisely what this hybrid activity seeks to exploit. GPS jamming and spoofing, drone incursions (into a number of countries now), cyber-attacks, low flypasts, uninsured oil-smugglers and vessels like the Yantar snooping around the cables and pipes that keep our country running are all increasing. This is now a concerted campaign. We therefore need to get better at operating in our own grey zone – imposing a cost back on them –because if they are OK with potentially blinding our pilots, then it’s clear that strong words are no longer working.
Other more traditional activities are increasing as well. The rate of Russian nuclear powered submarines sortieing into the North Atlantic is going up. Not by much, but it doesn’t need to, to stretch us. It’s also clear how important the North Atlantic and Baltic still are to Putin from the fact that as far as we know no Tu-142 “Bear-F” or “Bear-J” maritime patrol aircraft – Russia’s version of the P-8 Poseidon – have been deployed to the Black Sea since 2021, despite how useful they would be there. Putin’s Black Sea is struggling and yet these important surveillance assets remain North. Despite Ukraine, Putin knows what’s important.
Whilst the rate of incidents and incursions is increasing, the resources we have to meet it are not. The P-8 is an excellent aircraft but we bought just nine which isn’t enough. It’s possible that we only have enough RAF crews to operate four. The ageing Type 23 frigate is as good a platform as any for this sort of task, but the one we used this time, HMS Somerset, is also our on-call anti-submarine hunter, so what happens when a Russian Akula class submarine comes our way at the same time?
