The recent elections in the Czech Republic are likely to result in key changes in the country’s outlook. A turn away from current levels of support for Ukraine could well be sidelined by desires for more internal funding. Despite this, it is uncertain to what extent the new government will embark on this new course.
November 18, 2025 –
Michal Lebduška
–
Analysis
Soon-to-be prime minister of the Czech Republic, Andrzej Babiš. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock
Major changes are expected in the Czech Republic following the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, which took place on the first weekend of October 2025. A new majority was immediately formed from the former opposition, led by former prime minister and oligarch Andrej Babiš, who was tasked by President Petr Pavel with forming a new government. Babiš’s ANO movement is complemented by the far-right SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy) and the new party Motorists for Themselves, which defers to former President Václav Klaus and positions itself as a right-wing force with an emphasis on ideological conservatism and economic liberalism.
Together, they are now announcing a major shift away from Petr Fiala’s current policy, which could also affect Czech support for Ukraine. During his campaign, Babiš himself questioned the Czech ammunition initiative, under which Ukraine could receive as many as 1.8 million pieces of artillery ammunition this year alone. In addition, he repeatedly stated that the Czech Republic would no longer give Ukraine a single crown from its arms budget and regularly attacked Ukrainian refugees. However, the party with the most hardline attitude towards Ukraine is Tomio Okamura’s SPD, who was elected to chair the Chamber of Deputies and immediately ordered the Ukrainian flag to be removed from the parliament building.
The backdrop to the elections and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric was the Czech economic crisis following the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which Fiala’s government was unable to control. Like other countries, the Czech Republic struggled with high inflation. Real wages still have not reached pre-pandemic levels, and GDP in 2019 was not equalized until 2024. As a result, life for the average Czech has become very expensive, and Andrej Babiš focused heavily on domestic and economic issues in his campaign. He treated foreign policy and security issues as secondary, and they were essentially viewed through the prism of the economy and domestic problems. Hence the statements that the Czech Republic would no longer provide money from its budget for weapons for Ukraine, or the questioning of the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets as too expensive. In this context, the rhetoric that Ukraine should be supported at the NATO level and not from the Czech budget is also very characteristic, showing that Babiš has no problem with supporting Ukraine as such.
This trend is reflected in the proposed coalition programme, which was published in early November. It is a very general document, with a clear priority on domestic issues and an emphasis on populist handouts and increasing wages in the public sector. Interestingly, the coalition programme is clearly largely subordinate to the programme of the ANO movement, which, with 80 MPs out of a total of 200, will dominate parliament.
Although coalition partners are supposed to receive plenty of positions in the newly formed government, the coalition’s programme includes only a minimum of their demands. This is very evident in the case of the Motorists’ Party, whose programme included tax cuts, striving for a balanced budget and, in general, minimal state interference in the economy, which is clearly at odds with ANO’s very generous programme. Similarly, the SPD party is theoretically set to receive three ministries. In reality, however, the ministers will be “experts” chosen by Babiš himself, and not members of the party.
If there is anything else in the coalition’s entire programme and rhetoric besides the economy, it is an emphasis on national sovereignty, resistance to migration, green policies and non-governmental organizations, i.e. rhetoric characteristic of the far right. Civil society’s fears of attempts at restriction are therefore not unfounded. One of the victims to this may fall the foreign ministry’s programme of transformational support. Thanks to this programme, Czech non-governmental organizations have been working for many years in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and other regions to promote the democratization of local societies.
Behind this rhetoric, of course, lies a great deal of distance from some EU policies, which have long been treated as a scapegoat in the Czech Republic, including by a large part of the previous coalition led by Petr Fiala. And although the SPD was forced to abandon its most radical demands, such as a referendum on leaving the EU and NATO, the coalition programme explicitly states that “the European Union has its limitations.” Regardless of the fact that some of these steps will probably find allies across Europe as the mood changes, even among the leaders of the largest EU countries, the Czech government is likely to be marginalized within the EU. This will also be facilitated by the fact that the coalition parties are members of the minority and extreme European factions of Patriots for Europe and Europe of Sovereign Nations.
A characteristic feature of the section of the coalition programme devoted to foreign policy is the strong emphasis on economic diplomacy and “pragmatism”. This explicitly mentions maintaining good relations with neighbours and Israel, which is a Czech tradition, and strengthening the partnership with the US. In addition, the government also wants to maintain “good or at least normal relations” with other world powers, which can be interpreted as a nod primarily to China.
The election campaign already placed considerable emphasis on regional cooperation and, first and foremost, on rebuilding the Visegrad Group. This reflects the long-standing orientation of the coalition partners, led by Babiš himself, towards an alliance with politicians such as Viktor Orbán. Equally characteristic is the reference to Donald Trump’s current US administration. However, this is where a certain problem arises. As part of his “anti-war” rhetoric, Babiš is opposed to a radical increase in defence spending and has questioned the purchase of F-35 aircraft for the Czech army. Therefore, the new Czech government will probably only imitate Trump rhetorically and will not become a “model ally” like contemporary Poland.
The composition of the government, Prime Minister Babiš’s interference and the potential for blackmail by coalition partners, mainly the SPD, will also have a significant impact on Czech foreign and security policy. The possible appointment of Filip Turek, a well-known influencer and the main face of the Motorists, as minister of foreign affairs has caused great concern. As a person with no diplomatic experience and radical views, he could do a lot of damage to the Czech diplomatic apparatus. This is all the more so because even before the elections, there was controversy surrounding him due to his “warm attitude” towards Nazi symbolism. The Motorists are continuing with his nomination, but it is already clear today that he cannot become a minister. After the elections, many scandalous comments by Turek appeared in the media from his social networks, which are full of violence and references to the Third Reich.
In light of this, the door is now open for someone less controversial with experience in diplomacy. According to media reports, the hitherto little-known diplomat Karel Beran, who was previously ambassador to Spain and Argentina, could become foreign minister, which would bring a little more continuity than the appointment of the radical Turek.
Importantly, the Czech President Petr Pavel, who is a major player on the political scene, is heavily involved in these issues and is trying to maintain the existing policy framework, mainly in terms of support for Ukraine. On the one hand, he had no problem entrusting the winner Babiš with the task of forming a new government. At the same time, however, he is strongly signalling his reservations about figures such as Filip Turek and the rhetoric of the new coalition in general. This was evident, for example, during the Independence Day celebrations on October 28th, when he focused his speech on the importance of civil society for the country.
The last important issue is the new Czech government’s policy towards Ukraine and Russia. Andrej Babiš cannot be certainly labelled as a pro-Russian politician, but as already mentioned, during the election campaign, the new coalition partners used anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and promised to limit support. What is very characteristic is that in the proposed coalition programme, the topic of Ukraine is only mentioned briefly, stating that the government “will support diplomatic steps leading to the end of the war”. There is not even a word about Russia.
In this context, however, it should be emphasized that the previous Czech government allocated very little budgetary resources to support Ukraine, and the army has long since had virtually no equipment that it could transfer to Kyiv. Therefore, little is likely to change in these areas. At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that Babiš’s government will in any way restrict the activities of the Czech arms industry, which is an important partner for Ukraine.
Another issue is active support for Ukraine on the international stage, the fate of Czech involvement in the country’s recovery, and mainly the Czech ammunition initiative. On the one hand, Andrej Babiš is unlikely to block decisions crucial for Ukraine at the EU level, including those concerning its accession to the community. However, it is already known that Tomáš Kopečný, the government’s envoy for the recovery of Ukraine, who has done a lot of good for Ukraine, is ending his mission. With his resignation, the future of the Czech Republic’s involvement in the recovery of Ukraine, which was not insignificant considering little allocated funds, is now in question. However, Babiš could be persuaded by a certain pragmatism and the fact that these are initiatives that help Czech businesses that want to get involved in Ukraine. It is no coincidence that in a telephone conversation with Volodymyr Zelenskyy shortly after the elections, Babiš’s visit to Kyiv as prime minister in 2019, when he was accompanied by a large delegation of Czech entrepreneurs, was mentioned. At that time, Babiš spoke very positively about Ukraine as a country full of business opportunities.
Even before the elections, Andrej Babiš signalled his strongest opposition to the allegedly “non-transparent” Czech ammunition initiative. Paradoxically, from what is known, it is not the initiative itself that is an obstacle for Babiš, but his personal dislike of Michal Strnad, the owner of the largest Czech arms company Czechoslovak Group. Strnad profits from the initiative and has become so wealthy from the war in Ukraine that, at the age of 33, he has become the richest Czech overall, surpassing even the new prime minister. In this regard, however, strong pressure can be seen from President Pavel, who wants to keep the initiative alive. Even if it were to be abandoned by the new government, little would change for Ukraine, as there are already countries willing to take over the programme. This of course would mean a loss of reputation for the Czech Republic.
In summary, it is evident that the foreign policy of Andrej Babiš’s government will be largely subordinated to internal needs and will not play as important a role as it has done so far. The Czech Republic will most likely be sidelined in the EU, and the government will focus more on allies such as Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump. At the same time, it should be remembered that Andrej Babiš will not want to remain completely isolated and will seek contact with major players on the international stage, as this is something he personally enjoys and his voters appreciate. Previously, for example, he often boasted that French President Emmanuel Macron was his friend.
When it comes to Ukraine and the war itself, Babiš would probably be most happy if he simply did not have to deal with this issue. We can assume that active support for Ukraine will be significantly reduced and that some of the Czech government’s existing activities, including the ammunition initiative, which the president is pushing to continue, will also be threatened. On the other hand, however, Babiš will most likely not block important EU decisions and may “pragmatically” support Czech businesses interested in Ukraine. The biggest question mark at this point is how much pressure radical coalition partners, mainly from the SPD, will put on soon-to-be Prime Minister Babiš in such matters. However, the lack of their votes in parliament could be offset by opposition MPs who could support Babiš’s government on some important issues.
Michal Lebduška is a research fellow with AMO, the Prague-based Association for International Affairs. His research focuses on politics, security and society in Ukraine, Poland and Belarus, as well as Ukrainian-Polish relations.
New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below.
Andrej Babiš, Czech politics, Czech Republic, elections, military support, Russian war against Ukraine
