Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 17, 2025

Toplines

Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly and explicitly outlined his continued commitment to his maximalist war aims in Ukraine — the same aims for which Putin launched his full-scale invasion in 2022. Putin spoke on December 17 to an expanded meeting of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) board, where he claimed that Russia will “undoubtedly” achieve its war goals in Ukraine.[1] Putin claimed that Russia would prefer to use diplomatic means to achieve its war goals and address the alleged “root causes” of the war (a term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand to mean its original war justifications and demands). Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik similarly noted on December 17 that Russia’s goal remains to eliminate the root causes of the war, which Kolesnik stated “means the demilitarization [and] denazification” of Ukraine — a reference to Russia’s original aims of severely limiting the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, the removal of the current Ukrainian government, and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in its place.[2]

Putin also reiterated Russia’s commitment to eventually achieving its wider territorial aims in Ukraine, claiming that Russia will “liberat[e] its historical lands” through military means if Ukraine and the West “refuse to engage in substantive discussions.”[3] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly referred to wide expanses of Ukrainian territory beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed as “historical” and “Russian” territory. Kremlin officials have often labelled Odesa City as a “Russian” city and discussed “Novorossiya” — an amorphous invented region in southern and eastern Ukraine that the Kremlin has claimed is “integral” to Russia, and that covers territory beyond the five regions that Russia has illegally annexed.[4] The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected US- and Ukrainian-proposed peace plans while trying to shift the blame for the lack of progress in negotiations onto Ukraine.[5] Putin’s claim about seizing Russia’s “historical” territories if Ukraine and the West refuse to engage in negotiations likely aims to put the responsibility on continued Russian efforts to achieve Putin’s original war aims on Ukraine — not Russia.

Putin’s statements continue to demonstrate that he will not be satisfied with a peace agreement based on the US-proposed 28-point peace plan. The Kremlin has not publicly and explicitly stated that it would accept the 28-point plan or any subsequent versions, but rather has been rejecting many points of the plan in recent weeks.[6] The statements by Putin and other Kremlin officials make clear that Putin has no intention of giving up his maximalist objectives in Ukraine and will seek to pursue them after any suspension of hostilities on conditions short of those objectives. The repeated Kremlin statements contradicting elements of the 28-point plan call into question Putin’s willingness to accept even that outline agreement and demonstrate how essential a reliable security guarantee for Ukraine will be to the durability of any agreement.

The 28-point plan called for Russia to relinquish the territory it controls outside of occupied Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and for the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts to freeze.[7] Putin and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov indicated during the Russian MoD board meeting that Russia will not be satisfied with those lines. Putin noted that Russian forces are creating and expanding “buffer zones” in Ukraine.[8] Belousov continued to claim that Russian forces have seized Kupyansk — despite evidence of Ukrainian forces liberating a significant portion of the town.[9] Belousov claimed that the alleged seizure of Kupyansk will expand Russia’s buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast, thereby reducing the threat of Ukrainian shelling against northern areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast. Putin similarly tasked Russian forces with creating a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts in the past, and the Kremlin is likely also to demand cede some of this territory due to Russia’s alleged need for a buffer zone.[10] Belousov highlighted Russia’s commitment to achieving control of all of Zaporizhia Oblast, claiming that ongoing Russian efforts to seize Hulyaipole and Orikhiv will “pave the way” for the seizure of the entire oblast.

Robust security guarantees for Ukraine are essential to ensure that any future agreement produces a sustainable peace, but the Kremlin has been publicly rejecting the idea of such guarantees.[11] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 17, for example, that Russia’s position on foreign military contingents operating on Ukrainian territory is well known, consistent, and clear, and Kolesnik stated that Russia will not tolerate European security guarantees with troop deployments to Ukraine.[12] The Kremlin is likely seeking a peace agreement without security guarantees in order to set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine in the future, in order to achieve Putin’s maximalist war aim of gaining full effective control over Ukraine.

Belousov used Russia’s seizure of small- and medium-sized settlements to support false Russia claims that Russian forces can rapidly seize the significantly larger population centers comprising Ukraine’s Fortress Belt. Belousov falsely claimed that the collapse of Ukrainian defenses is “inevitable,” continuing extensive Kremlin cognitive warfare efforts that aim to portray a Russian battlefield victory as inevitable in order to influence ongoing peace negotiations.[13] Belousov claimed that Russian forces are fighting within Kostyantynivka, which Belousov stated is “key” to seizing Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk — major cities that make up the heavily fortified Fortress Belt that serves as the backbone of Ukraine’s defense in Donetsk Oblast. Belousov highlighted Russia’s seizure of small- and medium-sized settlements, such as Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Mala Tokmachka. Belousov also claimed that Russian forces seized Siversk and Pokrovsk (which ISW has not observed evidence to confirm) and noted that Russian forces are currently trying to seize Hulyaipole and Lyman. Russian forces have often spent months trying to seize these small- and medium-sized settlements and have notably been fighting within Pokrovsk itself for almost 140 days.[14]

The cities in Ukraine’s Fortress Belt are significantly larger than the small- and medium-sized settlements that Belousov highlighted. Kurakhove is only about seven square kilometers in size and had a pre-war population of only 5,000. Siversk and Chasiv Yar are both about 10 square kilometers with pre-war populations of about 11,000 to 12,000.

Pokrovsk, which Russian forces have been trying to take for nearly two years, is about 23 square kilometers with a pre-war population of 60,000. Kostyantynivka has an area of 33 square kilometers and a pre-war population of 67,000. Druzhkivka is 23 square kilometers with a pre-war population of 54,000. Kramatorsk is 48 square kilometers with a pre-war population of 147,000. Slovyansk is 63 square kilometers with a pre-war population of 105,000. Belousov is attempting to present Russia’s seizure of much smaller settlements as evidence of Russia’s ability to rapidly seize the much larger cities in the Fortress Belt, but battlefield realities indicate otherwise.

Belousov claimed that Russian forces have seized 6,000 square kilometers along the entire frontline during 2025 — an area smaller than the US state of Delaware and just under one percent of Ukraine’s total land area.[15] ISW assesses that Russian forces have seized only 4,699.04 square kilometers in 2025 — an area slightly larger than the size of Rhode Island.[16] Even Belousov’s exaggerated claims about Russian advances demonstrate the slow pace of those advances. Belousov claimed that the Russian seizure of the Fortress Belt will enable Russian forces to “quickly” seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, but his statements about Russian advances in 2025 are actually in line with ISW’s assessment that it will take Russian forces two or more years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at great cost.[17]

Belousov’s comments demonstrate that Russian forces are optimizing themselves for positional warfare in Ukraine — not for the mechanized maneuver required to make rapid, large-scale gains. Belousov laid out a series of technological and tactical adaptations that Russian forces have made on the battlefield in the last year, including the increased use of drones for reconnaissance and fire missions, the effectiveness of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, the reliance on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to quickly traverse the “kill zone” in the face of drones, and the increased use of trench-based electronic warfare (EW) systems.[18] Many of these Russian adaptations actually demonstrate how the Russian military has optimized itself for positional warfare in Ukraine rather than preparing to resume fast paced mechanized maneuver in Ukraine — as ISW recently assessed.[19] Belousov’s statements further show that the Russian MoD does not expect the character of the war to quickly change but is preparing rather to continue positional warfare and slow grinding advances. Russian forces have developed a minimally sufficient operational technique that can enable very slow operational successes, but this approach does not translate effectively to maneuver warfare on a wide scale and will not allow Russian forces to rapidly collapse Ukrainian defenses in the short- to medium-term.[20]

Belousov sought to conceal Russia’s military manpower problems. Belousov claimed that nearly 410,000 Russians have signed contracts with the Russian MoD since the beginning of 2025 — 8,200 per week or 32,800 per month.[21] Data from the Ukrainian General Staff on Russian losses indicate that Russian forces suffered an average of 34,600 casualties per month between January and November 2025 — suggesting that Belousov’s recruitment numbers are not quite replacing Russian losses. Belousov’s claimed figure is likely exaggerated, as Russian opposition media investigations examining Russian federal budget expenditures on payouts to new recruits have recently shown.[22] The Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to mobilize reservists for likely deployment to Ukraine in the future further indicate that Russia cannot meet its force generation requirements through the ongoing system that uses high financial incentives to recruit volunteers due to a lack of volunteers, a lack of resources to fund the payouts, or both.[23] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s efforts to deploy reservists to Ukraine are a domestically risky policy threatening to break the Kremlin’s ongoing social contract with the population, and the Kremlin would likely not pursue this force generation method unless necessary. Belousov is likely inflating the recruitment numbers to quell domestic worries about compulsory reserve mobilization.

Putin and Belousov highlighted Russian military and nuclear strength while threatening Europe. Putin claimed that it is “nonsense” that Russia poses a threat to Europe and that NATO, rather, is threatening Russia by preparing for a future confrontation.[24] Putin and Belousov simultaneously spotlighted Russia’s military expansion efforts, strategic nuclear forces, and new weapons systems, such as the Burevestnik missile and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle. Belousov claimed that Ukraine and the West are trying to prolong the war in order to weaken Russia and that NATO policies to prepare for a future war have created “preconditions” for Russia’s continued military action into 2026. Belousov stated that Russia must therefore continue to impose its will on its “enemy,” act preemptively, and refine its warfighting methods and techniques. Kolesnik also claimed on December 17 that Europe is playing “Russian roulette,” which Russians “have always won,” by supporting Ukraine.[25] Kolesnik claimed that Russia should show Germany the Soviet Victory Banner from the Second World War more often and that Germany should “think about Germany’s future.” Belousov’s false claims that Ukrainian defenses are on the brink of collapse are incongruous with Russia’s large-scale military expansion and weapons development efforts — if Ukraine is about to collapse, then the continued military mobilization of Russia should be unnecessary. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ongoing military reforms and expansion efforts reflect the reality that Russia is in no position to defeat Ukraine rapidly and are also part of preparation for a potential conflict with NATO in the future.[26]

Key Takeaways

1. Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly and explicitly outlined his continued commitment to his maximalist war aims in Ukraine – the same aims for which Putin launched his full-scale invasion in 2022.
2. Putin’s statements continue to demonstrate that he will not be satisfied with a peace agreement based on the US-proposed 28-point peace plan.
3. Robust security guarantees for Ukraine are essential to ensure that any future agreement produces a sustainable peace, but the Kremlin has been publicly rejecting the idea of such guarantees.
4. Belousov used Russia’s seizure of small- and medium-sized settlements to support false Russia claims that Russian forces can rapidly seize the significantly larger population centers comprising Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.
5. Belousov’s comments demonstrate that Russian forces are optimizing themselves for positional warfare in Ukraine – not for the mechanized maneuver required to make rapid, large-scale gains.
6. Belousov sought to conceal Russia’s military manpower problems.
7. Putin and Belousov highlighted Russian military and nuclear strength while threatening Europe.
8. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of December 16 to 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 17 that Ukrainian forces struck the Slavyansky Oil Refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai, overnight, which later geolocated footage confirms.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery processes crude oil and condensate with a capacity of 5.2 million tons per year and is involved in supplying oil to the Russian military. The Krasnodar Krai Operations Headquarters acknowledged that Ukrainian forces targeted the oil refinery and caused a 100 square meter fire that burned technical equipment and a pipe.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Nikolaevskaya Oil Depot in Rostov Oblast.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on December 16 and 17.[30]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Krolevets (northwest of Sumy City).[31] Drone operators of the Chechen “Pitersky” Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment, the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division), and of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[32]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[33]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchansk, Synelnykove, Vovchanski Khutory, Vilcha, and Lyman, and toward Izbytske and Hrafske on December 16 and 17.[34]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces posted documents on December 17 purportedly confirming that the Russian military command sent Russian servicemembers of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) that were wounded in action back into combat near Starytsia (northeast of Kharkiv City).[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie, east of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka, and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and toward Kolodyazne on December 16 and 17.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2

Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kupyansk — an area where Russian forces previously had conducted infiltration missions.[38]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on December 17 that indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), although ISW does not assess that these changes occurred in the past 24 hours.[39]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk toward Kucherivka and Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and toward Pishchane on December 16 and 17.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[41]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on December 17 that Ukrainian forces have liberated almost 90 percent of Kupyansk.[42] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian army corps operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on December 17 that Ukrainian forces have been slowly clearing Russian forces out of Kupyansk since September 2025, relying heavily on drones to support clearing operations.[43] The spokesperson noted that remaining Russian forces in Kupyansk lack ammunition and have limited resources.

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized the Russian MoD on December 16 for spreading footage of Russian servicemembers purportedly patrolling in Kupyansk to support the MoD’s claim that Russian forces control Kupyansk, noting that the weather conditions in the video are not the current weather conditions on the ground in Kupyansk.[44] The milblogger noted that Russian media coordinated a response to reports that Ukrainian forces had retaken parts of Kupyansk and surrounding areas and claimed that the media response is harmful and contributing to the unrest in the information space.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on December 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka; and southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna and Novovodyane and toward Stepove on December 16 and 17.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Novoplatonivka (north of Borova).[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and toward Korovii Yar, Oleksandrivka, Sosnove, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky, Hlushchenkove, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske on December 16 and 17.[47]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on December 17 that Russian forces are using large quantities of infantry in assaults and recently deployed new, undertrained, and underequipped reinforcements to the area.[48] The spokesperson acknowledged that Russian forces are advancing in the Lyman direction, but with heavy losses.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of December 16 to 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 17  that Ukrainian forces struck an artillery and ammunition depot of the Russian 101st Logistics Brigade (reportedly of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Novoborovytsi (roughly 143 kilometers from the frontline).[49] Geolocated footage confirms the strike.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Yampil (northwest of Siversk) and likely seized Yampil on a prior date.[51] Ukrainian military sources told Ukrainian media outlet Ukrainska Pravda on December 13 that Russian forces advanced to the Bakhmutka River in western Siversk, although ISW assesses that this change did not occur in the past 24 hours.[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Sakko i Vantsetti and near Pazeno (both southwest of Siversk).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk toward Ozerne and Dibrova; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk toward Pazeno on December 16 and 17.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Bondarne; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 16 and 17.[55]

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on December 17 that Russian forces conducted a “double-tap” first-person view (FPV) drone strike against emergency workers responding to a fire caused by a Russian strike in Druzhkivka, injuring four emergency workers.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Vilne, and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie and Ivanivka on December 16 and 17.[57]

Ukraine’s 1st Azov National Guard Corps posted footage and reported on December 16 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reduced platoon-sized motorized assault in the Dobropillya direction involving 16 all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) under the cover of fog.[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[59]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.  

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Rivne (east of Pokrovsk) — an area where Russian forces had previously conducted infiltration missions.[60]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 15 and 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk and to central Novopidhorodne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[61] Geolocated footage published on December 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced northwest of Pokrovsk along the 00525 Hryshyne-Pokrovsk road, although ISW assesses that this change did not occur within the last 24 hours.[62]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 17 shows Russian forces operating in southeastern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[63]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad, Rivne, and Svitle; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on December 16 and 17.[64]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 17 that the situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains difficult as Russian forces continue attacks both during the day and at night, exploiting poor weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations to infiltrate past Ukrainian defenses.[65] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces continue to increase the size of their assault groups and that the Russian military command has committed elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to urban combat within Pokrovsk itself. The spokesperson added that Russian forces are unable to cross the Donetska railway within Pokrovsk and are instead attempting to bypass Ukrainian positions in the town from the flanks, especially from the west toward Hryshyne.   

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles on the outskirts of Myrnohrad.[66] Zala reconnaissance drone operators of the 7th Unmanned Systems Regiment (reportedly under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on December 16 and 17, but did not advance.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove, Zelenyi Hai, and Ivanivka; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sosnivka, Verbove, Sichneve, and Krasnohirske on December 16 and 17.[69]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on December 17 that Russian forces continue to conduct attritional assaults while exploiting foggy, rainy, and snowy conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone capabilities.[70] The spokesperson reported that Russian assault troops in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) are well-trained and equipped.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on December 17 that Russian forces seized Herasymivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[71] Russian sources credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Herasymivka.[72] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Herasymivka.[73]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Ostapivske and Dobropillya and toward Bratske and Andriivka; north of Hulyaipole near Solodke and Zlahoda; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne and Rybne on December 16 and 17.[74] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Hulyaipole.[75]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on December 17 that Russian forces continue to leverage poor weather conditions to advance in the Hulyaipole direction and acknowledged that there are small pockets of Russian infiltration groups in the northeastern and eastern outskirts of Hulyaipole.[76] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces only use equipment to conduct logistics rather than to attack.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 60th and 57th separate motorized rifle brigades (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces within and around Hulyaipole.[77]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 16 and 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) and in western Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv).[78]  The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on December 17 that indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Stepove and Kamyanske (both west of Orikhiv), although ISW does not assess that these changes occurred in the past 24 hours.[79]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Shcherbaky, Stepove, Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske and Lukyanivske on December 16 and 17.[80]

Geolocated footage published on December 16 shows Russian forces conducting a Lancet loitering munitions strike over 30 kilometers from the frontline in western Zaporizhzhia City.[81] The Ukrainian National Police and Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on December 17 that Russian forces conducted guided glide bomb strikes against residential buildings and civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, injuring 29 civilians, including 5 children.[82]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and Phoenix drone crews (likely part of BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center [formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne Forces]) are reportedly operating near Orikhiv.[83] Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[84]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on December 17.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[85]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 69 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 40 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[86] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 37 drones and that 29 drones struck 12 locations.[87] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts.[88] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed on December 17 that Russian strikes have disabled over 70 percent of Ukraine’s thermal power plants and 37 percent of Ukraine’s hydroelectric power plants.[89] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s intensified strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is a concerted Russian effort to degrade Ukraine’s energy security and industrial capacity and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[90]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko endorsed the Russian occupation of Crimea on December 16 and falsely claimed that Ukraine allowed the Russian occupation of Crimea to happen unopposed.[91] Lukashenko further claimed that Ukraine will continue the war if the West does not force Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to the peace table.[92]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78801
[2] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/12/17/garantii/
[3] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78801
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025/;  https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2025/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025/
[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78801
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2025/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/
[12] https://tass dot ru/politika/25936029; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/12/17/garantii/
[13] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78801; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-critical-importance-of-ukraines-fortress-belt-in-donetsk-oblast/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025/
[18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78801
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/the-russian-military-forecasting-the-threat/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/the-russian-military-forecasting-the-threat/
[21] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78801
[22] https://istories dot media/news/2025/11/17/v-tretem-kvartale-2025-goda-kontrakt-s-minoboroni-rf-podpisali-bolee-135-tis-chelovek/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2025/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/warning-the-kremlin-is-preparing-to-mobilize-reservists-on-a-rolling-basis-to-fight-in-ukraine-for-the-first-time/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/
[24] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78801
[25] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/12/17/finansirovaniye/amp/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-by-the-ukraine-war/
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32671 ; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2001060844168216993?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2001111354103455789?s=20
[28] https://t.me/opershtab23/14664
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32671
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/85116 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/59525 
[32] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6230 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37468 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190851
[33] https://t.me/rybar/76025
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19816 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19814 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/85116 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37487 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14844 ; https://t.me/rybar/76025
[35] https://t.me/severnnyi/6052
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37487
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19816 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19814 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37487 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/85116
[38] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/12057; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10795
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32659
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19814 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/6049 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37507
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32673; https://t.me/osirskiy/1342
[43] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/12/17/zachystka-tryvatyme-dovgo-adzhe-zhyttya-vazhlyvishe-u-kupyansku-rosiyany-shukayut-yizhu-po-pidvalah-i-kvartyrah/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uu50wPIJ4ps
[44] https://t.me/rybar/76009
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19816 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19814 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655
[46] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14844
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19816 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19814 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37509
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/17/infiltruyutsya-tynyayutsya-hodyat-yak-zombi-nepodalik-lymana-vorog-ubyvaye-ob-ukrayinsku-oboronu-sotni-svoyih-shturmovykiv/
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32671; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/12/17/voyiny-sso-vdaryly-po-vorozhomu-polovomu-artylerijskomu-skladu-na-luganshhyni/
[50] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2001312327069507921?s=20; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2001318028508610663?s=20; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2334
[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10793; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/763
[52] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2025/12/13/8011686/
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/85116
[54]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655; https://t.me/dva_majors/85116; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155
[55]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155; https://t.me/dva_majors/85116
[56] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/55068
[57]https://t.me/dva_majors/85116; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655; https://t.me/dva_majors/85116; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155
[58] https://t.me/azov_media/7742; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/25449; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/12/17/tuman-kvadroczykly-j-nul-rezultatu-syly-oborony-rozgromyly-motopihotu-rf-pid-dobropillyam/
[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/85122
[60] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2001157910533906475;  https://x.com/7corpsDSHV/status/2000853557197562278
[61] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10799; https://t.me/yokaiUA/420; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2001059232607617521;  https://t.me/mapukrdailyupdate/3823
[62] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32415; https://t.me/skala425/742; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1999785325074547147
[63] https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/2228; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10797
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155; https://t.me/tass_agency/353260; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37504
[65] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/17/styrayutsya-zagruznuvshy-v-miskyh-boyah-v-pokrovsku-rosijski-desantnyky-ne-mozhut-peretnuty-zaliznychnu-koliyu/
[66] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14765
[67] https://t.me/wargonzo/31151
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655
[70] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScUsgfjUwIA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/17/pobachyv-yake-peklo-ta-nazad-ne-zmig-pobigty-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-postijno-eksperymentuyut/
[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/59493; https://t.me/mod_russia/59495; https://t.me/tass_agency/353257; https://t.me/tass_agency/353258;
[72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105814; https://t.me/mod_russia/59496; https://t.me/voin_dv/18068; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37494
[73] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105814
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655; https://t.me/dva_majors/85116; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155; https://t.me/rusich_army/27401
[75] https://t.me/rybar/76024; https://t.me/rusich_army/27401
[76] https://armyinform.com [dot] ua/2025/12/17/robotamy-i-dronamy-perekydaye-boyeprypasy-j-prodovolstvo-v-gulyajpoli-vorog-namagayetsya-vtrymatysya-v-budynkah-na-shodi-mista/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uu50wPIJ4ps
[77] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2001258210511216937; https://t.me/voin_dv/18071; https://t.me/dva_majors/85112
[78] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10794; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/680; https:// t.me/tgkryucova/48; https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/10808;
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32659
[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32656; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32655; https://t.me/dva_majors/85116; https://t.me/wargonzo/31155
[81] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10803; https://t.me/aukrop/480; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/27245; https://t.me/Osintpen/2244;
[82] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/30046; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/30045; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/53357; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/30065; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/12/17/aviaudar-po-zaporizhzhyu-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-zrosla-do-20-sered-nyh-dytyna/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/55094
[83] https://t.me/dva_majors/85134; https://t.me/dva_majors/76780
[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37461 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37498 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37479
[85] https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/2858; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31440
[86] https://t.me/kpszsu/49985
[87] https://t.me/kpszsu/49985
[88] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/12/16/na-harkivshhyni-vnaslidok-vorozhoyi-ataky-postrazhdaly-dvoye-nepovnolitnih/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/26099 ; https://t.me/synegubov/18989 ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/8247 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1191014-na-kiivsini-poskodzeni-dva-budinki-vid-nicnoi-ataki-sahediv/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/12947 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1191056-rf-atakuvala-bpla-civilni-obekti-odesini-aki-naslidki-obstrilu/
[89] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78801
[90] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-updates/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2024
[91] https://t.me/pul_1/19469; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/350835 
[92] https://t.me/tass_agency/353196