By Derek Grossman
U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to Malaysia in October for the annual ASEAN summit, along with his Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s engagements throughout the region, offers fresh evidence of how the administration is faring on its Southeast Asia policy. The verdict is mixed: while Washington scored significant policy deliverables for itself and the region, it leaves much to be desired. There was the good, the bad, and the ugly in the Trump administration’s recent regional trek, with important policy implications going forward.
Trump’s decision to attend the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur was a positive development. Recent presidents — Trump in his first term and Joe Biden — have attended in-person infrequently. Biden attended in-person only once in Cambodia in 2022 and virtually in 2021 during the pandemic. During Trump’s first term, he attended only once in 2017 in the Philippines, after which he sent Vice President Mike Pence and lower-level officials to subsequent summits. And so his participation in 2025 should not be taken for granted. As Americans have come to understand, showing up in Southeast Asia is more than half the battle.
While in Malaysia, Trump signed several important agreements with Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand to secure their critical minerals and gradually reduce reciprocal tariffs on certain exports to the U.S. The U.S. and Vietnam also agreed on a framework for their forthcoming trade agreement that maintains 20 per cent tariffs on most Vietnamese goods but reduces duties on certain products.
A few days after Trump departed, Hegseth visited Kuala Lumpur for the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+). He met Malaysian Defence Minister Khaled Nordin and signed a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation while renewing an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. With Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, he announced the establishment of “Task Force Philippines” to improve joint operations against China in the South China Sea. He later met Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun to discuss, among other items, how to reduce tensions and misperceptions in the South China Sea, though nothing substantial came of the engagement.
Finally, Hegseth visited Vietnam for two days and inked an agreement reaffirming U.S. cooperation on sensitive war legacy issues. The memorandum covered Agent Orange decontamination, unexploded ordnance removal, and better information exchange to locate killed or missing soldiers from both countries. Although not new, this cooperation was threatened by the Trump administration’s shuttering of USAID via the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) earlier this year. Hanoi values the engagement because it directly benefits the Vietnamese people. For Washington, the deal helps to reduce the perception that it engages Vietnam solely to counter China.
But not everything was great about the Trump administration’s visits. Trump’s presiding over a peace ceremony involving Cambodia and Thailand to mark the end of the border violence, which occurred in July, reflected the naked transparency of his personal motivations (Thailand has recently suspended the deal). Trump has publicly been vying to win the Nobel Peace Prize, repeatedly arguing that he deserves the award for ‘resolving’ so many wars since returning to office in January.
This would not be so bad, except Trump reportedly made his ASEAN summit participation contingent upon the regional bloc arranging this ceremony. Essentially, ASEAN had to accommodate his political theatrics and make it look like he was being feted on the world stage in exchange for his attendance. This suggested that the Trump administration is fundamentally unserious about the policy issues affecting the region.
After returning to the U.S., Trump lifted the Biden-era arms embargo on Cambodia over human rights, corruption, and closeness to China. This was clearly a quid pro quo – Trump was pleased with the peace ceremony and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet’s August nomination of him for the Nobel Peace Prize.
Washington’s willingness to sideline human rights concerns for strategic gains represents a departure from the principles that once defined its engagement in the region, signaling a changed America that strays far from the rules-based order it once created.
To be sure, a stronger U.S.-Cambodia partnership is not a bad thing. Indeed, this author recently commended the Trump administration’s improved ties with Cambodia to counter Chinese influence. Hegseth made some progress here by re-establishing annual joint military drills, known as Angkor Sentinel, and possibly securing a U.S. Navy ship visit to Ream Naval Base.
But Washington’s willingness to sideline human rights concerns for strategic gains represents a departure from the principles that once defined its engagement in the region, signalling a changed America that strays far from the rules-based order it once created. It appears that ASEAN has been adept at navigating this form of American transactionalism — indeed, some member states may prefer such pragmatism — and perhaps their concessions so far demonstrate that Washington’s influence still holds sway in Southeast Asia in the immediate terms. But whether this trade-off serves long-term American strategic interests in the region remains an open question.
The worst or “ugly” part about the Trump administration’s visit to Southeast Asia revolves around one word: tariffs. Although the president made several deals to reduce reciprocal tariffs, these agreements were vague and signed with only a few ASEAN member states (Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam) — leaving the rest hanging out to dry.
Trump’s reciprocal tariff pacts also do not protect any Southeast Asian countries from possible Section 232 investigations based on U.S. national security concerns in the future. And for all of ASEAN, the Trump administration reserves the right to implement so-called transshipment tariffs of up to 40 per cent if it believes certain countries are re-exporting Chinese goods. The administration has been vague as to what constitutes transhipment.
There were clearly good, bad, and ugly points from the Trump administration’s visits to Southeast Asia. On the good side, Washington can certainly deliver substantive wins for both sides when it engages (though it appears Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is now facing domestic backlash for selling out to Trump). However, Trump has also alienated partners through his personality-driven politics. The U.S. risks long-term reputational harm by treating ASEAN as a performative stage rather than as an important strategic partner. Regardless, reciprocal tariffs are extremely unhelpful in the context of facilitating a return to building trust and achieving new heights in cooperation.
Derek Grossman is a Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Professor of the Practice of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California.
This article originally appeared on Fulcrum and was republished here with the permission of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
